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Reorganizing in Massachusetts.

An attempt is making in Massachusetts to find some new issues and principles upon which the Republican party can be united, and enabled to recover from the disasters of last fall. The Bay State Republicans are greatly bothered by the fact that the young men are inclined to vote the Democratic ticket, and the formation of Young Republican clubs is one of the means relied upon for tracing up Republicanism. Some of the Young Republicans, however, are of the opinion that the party is not so young as they might be, and yet are not so old that they can't remember when they first held office, united on a declaration of principles not long ago, and proposed a sort of new departure. They built a very pretty set of resolutions, but the harmony of the Republican party doesn't seem to have been increased thereby. The fact is that the Republican party of Massachusetts is not in condition, and yet doesn't know what is the matter with itself. With two such utterly useless and ridiculous persons as Mr. DAVIS and Mr. HOAR holding the principal offices in its ranks, it can't expect to be in the best of strength and discipline, but the claim for the success of these venerable inefficiencies are so greedy and numerous that war is sure to break out among them. The old campaigners and the young campaigners distrust one another; and the latter think that the party policy as well as the party leadership needs to be renewed and rejuvenated. "We are split up as a party," said the Hon. WILLIAM E. BARRETT, Speaker of the House of Representatives, at a dinner of the Norfolk Club last Saturday, "because we are not bringing to the front questions in which the people are interested; because we continue to stand on the issues that were popular twenty or twenty-five years ago, and are not on the issues of the present. To-day we have no party unity, no party ideas, and no party symmetry." After a brief but powerful kick at the Hon. BENJAMIN HARRISON for allowing Democrats to remain in the Massachusetts Federal office, Speaker BARRETT proposed this strictly business like programme:

"The dominant spirit of the times is commercial. Those who affect the propriety of the individual are what people are the most interested in. We can get no more out of the individual than he can get out of the extension of trade, reciprocity, and commercial relations, both on this continent and abroad. When by appealing to these new issues we are red to power, we can extend to the people the benefits of the extension in the popular mind, and can be trusted to solve them in accordance with republican doctrine."

"By taking up this commercial, vital business question, we shall interest the whole people, and stand as the party of living issues."

We have no doubt that Mr. BARRETT is the favorite candidate of the Massachusetts Republicans, but is the Republican party in a position to appeal successfully to business men? The programme of reciprocity is a fascinating one, doubtless; but the Republicans have not had the wisdom to urge it. Instead they have been doing all in their power to unsettle and disturb business by trying to pass the Force bill, and Mr. HOAR of Massachusetts has been the most malignant leader of the disturbers. It would be pleasant for the Massachusetts Republicans to see the program of reciprocity, but the reactionary movement in the Fifty-first Congress and start out anew with an attractive and a clean policy of commercial extension; but the Force bill will not be forgotten. The young Democrats, whose loss the Republicans bewail, cannot be brought back to a party which is reckless enough to attack the freedom of Congress elections and silly enough to howl that it has been defeated by fraud in the South, when nearly the whole North has stamped upon it. Business men will be wary about trusting the promises of a party which shows that it cares nothing for the security of business in comparison with filching the power which it can no longer honestly retain. The chief cause to warm up the tottering limbs of Massachusetts Republicans has not yet been found.

Modern Surgery.

The practice of surgery has always been more or less of a science. Even in the earliest times very serious surgical operations were undertaken with success, and some of them are now often wrongly proclaimed as modern in their origin. Ovariectomy was practised by the ancient Hindus. An example of prehistoric trephining may be seen in a skull from Peru at the Museum of Natural History in this city.

The morbid conditions which the surgeon has to combat, are tangible and objective, so that his difficulties have been in the way of skillful manipulation of instruments. The management of internal vessels and the proper cleansing of wounds. But there are striking features in the surgical science of the past fifty years which mark epochs in its advance, and of which the surgeons of other centuries could scarcely have dreamed. The first of these was the introduction of anesthesia from chloroform and ether, making it possible for patients to undergo operations without the very pain which might under former conditions have caused their death. This has enabled the surgeon to prolong his procedure for hours if necessary, instead of limiting himself to the hurried seconds and minutes which must have seemed an age to the tortured and conscious sufferer. We are now so accustomed to hear of the use of anæsthetics in all operations that it hardly seems conceivable that so few years have elapsed since they were first employed.

Another revolution was accomplished by a discovery which has affected both surgery and medicine alike, and that is the germicidal action of antiseptics. When it was learned that air and dust and water were everywhere filled with countless millions of invisible germs, and that some species of these, by being inhaled or swallowed, entered and poisoned the blood, producing contagious and infectious fevers; that some were the cause of fermentation, and that putrefaction was also largely brought about by their presence, it did not take long for the surgeon to investigate their relation to the wounds which he was obliged to make, and through which these bacteria might readily find entrance into the system. Never before had he understood why erysipelas sometimes appeared in a wound; why blood poisoning would follow some of his operations; why some of his wounds would heal at once by first intention, while others would suppurate for weeks or show no tendency to heal; why tetanus or lockjaw was to be expected as

an occasional complication; why hospital gangrene would haunt his wards like a dread phantom that could not be dislodged. How many thousands of lives have been sacrificed through such ignorance? One need but glance through some medical history, such as that of the War of the Rebellion, to learn what havoc and devastation these invisible and unknown enemies made. Sabres, bullets, and cannon balls were trifles compared with them. More than three times as many soldiers fell victims to these invisible foes during the war as were killed in battle. Fully one-sixth as many were slain on the field from surgical germ diseases alone, from the infection of their wounds by the myriads of the air.

Now, the surgeon knows that no atmosphere, whether that of mountain or sea, is absolutely free from putrefactive germs, and that the air of hospital wards and sick rooms is particularly loaded with organic matter of all kinds, and with microbes in abundance. From these well-established facts has arisen what is known as the antiseptic treatment of wounds. Substances have been found which kill these germs, among the first and best of them carbolic acid; and now we have numerous germ-destroying agents. The modern surgeon goes rid of every microbe upon the surface of the part before operating, by shaving and thoroughly washing the skin with antiseptic solutions; every instrument, sponge, swab, and bandage is treated with them; his own hands and those of his assistants go through a similar process of disinfection; the operating room is made as germ-proof as possible by causing each nook and corner and wall to be of such material and shape that they may be scrubbed down frequently with bactericide; often a spray of antiseptic vapor is played into the air above the wound during the operation; the towels, bandages, and dressings of cotton, lint, and gauze are all made similarly safe. Should he meet with the old and too familiar symptoms, the surgeon knows there must have been some flaw in the preparations. The bacteria still occasionally outwit him; but the contrast between the results of the old and of the new is so marvellous. Antiseptic surgery is of such recent origin, however, that there are still many surgeons, generally older men and in the provincial districts, who either have no knowledge of the scientific facts, or who, bound fast by hereditary prejudices, profess to disbelieve in their truth, and continue to immolate fresh victims year after year upon the altar of their own ignorance.

As regards operative procedures themselves, anesthetics, antiseptics, improved methods of checking hemorrhage, and a variety of new instruments have made it possible, not only to undertake new operations and perfect old ones, but also to promise conservatism in surgery. The amputation of limbs, so common as formerly, for limbs are preserved by different operative methods under these new conditions which before it was considered impossible to save.

If there is anything, however, which serves to distinguish the surgery of this time from that of the past it is its visceral character. Then the operator busied himself chiefly with externals: outer tumors, the skin, limbs, and the like. Now his most brilliant work is among the organs contained in the cavities of the abdomen, chest, and head. No organ is beyond the reach of his knife. Pelvic organs are extirpated; large abdominal tumors, and such organs as the spleen, the kidney, and the liver, are often successfully removed. Injuries to the intestines and the stomach are no longer considered as necessarily fatal, for they may be sewed up, parts cut out and the ends approximated, very much like rubber hose. They are beginning to cut tubercles out of the lungs, and tumors are removed from regions in most dangerous proximity to the heart, the large blood vessels, and the great nerves. But most remarkable of all is the very recently developed surgery of the brain and spinal cord. This new departure is wholly owing to the wonderful advance made in the knowledge of the anatomy and physiology of the central nervous system. The surgeon depends upon the nerve supply of the morbid process in the brain or spinal cord, and to determine the nature of the disorder, whether hemorrhage, tumor, abscess, or whatever it may be. It is a dangerous region, but the results are sufficiently successful to warrant operations where death is imminent without them. Quite lately operations have been carried out upon the brain itself in peculiar forms of insanity, and in cases of idiocy where the growth of the brain seems to be hampered by too early union of the bones of the skull. In the latter case the design is to remove sufficient bone to allow the brain to grow. As in every novel project or enterprise, time is necessary before judgment can be passed upon the extent to which the operations for insanity and idiocy their actual value cannot be determined for at least ten years from their performance.

It is doubtful if much more can be done to perfect surgery as a science. Methods and technique may be improved, but there seems to be little territory left to explore. There is one direction perhaps in which further achievement is possible. As is well known, the surgeon usually takes away what is diseased or defective. The progress should be in the way of substitution. The transplantation of skin, hair, bone, and teeth, and the transfer of blood from one to another have been accomplished. We must now demand of him new eyes, new limbs, new internal organs, and new blood, and new brains in the place of those which have become so disordered as to require his supervision and manipulation.

For Concurrent Divorce Laws.

The association called the National Divorce Reform League has just held its annual meeting at Boston, the place where it originated and to which its headquarters are. The first of these was the introduction of anesthesia from chloroform and ether, making it possible for patients to undergo operations without the very pain which might under former conditions have caused their death. This has enabled the surgeon to prolong his procedure for hours if necessary, instead of limiting himself to the hurried seconds and minutes which must have seemed an age to the tortured and conscious sufferer. We are now so accustomed to hear of the use of anæsthetics in all operations that it hardly seems conceivable that so few years have elapsed since they were first employed.

at home. These wives, too, belong in great part to social circles which boast of their superiority, where conservatism and conventionalism unquestionably prevail. The Protestant Church which is most rigorous in demanding that adultery alone shall be the cause for divorce is the Episcopal; yet a large number of Episcopalian women in the highest fashionable society of this city have gone to Rhode Island and Delaware especially to get divorced for other causes, and afterward they have taken new husbands. According to the law of the Church, they are now living in adultery and not in holy matrimony; but they do not seem to be troubled on that account, and because of it they suffer from no social disabilities. Their example, also, is stimulating other discontented wives in the same circle to follow in their footsteps, so that divorce for any cause allowable by any State is becoming frequent among New York women of wealth and fashion. The Church is powerless to stay its progress. If divorce for any cause whatever receives religious sanction, it will be obtained on grounds that are legal anywhere in the Union. The Roman Catholic law that marriage is indissoluble except by death prevents all good Catholics from seeking divorce by civil means; but Protestantism by allowing one way of escape from matrimony affords a logical argument for permitting another.

At this period, too, a method of Biblical criticism and interpretation is pursued, with the highest theological approval, which justifies this greater latitude. Instead of binding men down to the literal construction of the Bible and treating it as the absolute and unchangeable Word of God, this new school of commentators apply reason, logic, science, and human philosophy as tests of its authority as revealed truth. So far as it satisfies these it is true, and only so far. Hence, of course, the old reverence for the Scriptures departs as a mere superstition, and human judgment is left free to make its marriage and divorce laws without regard to the mere letter of the New Testament. Even the results of the Reformation interpreted the Scriptural law of divorce so as to allow the dissolution of marriage for wilful desertion, and marriage is not included among the sacraments in Protestant Churches.

It appears, therefore, as if this Boston Divorce Reform League were proceeding in opposition to the present tendency of Protestant sentiment and the public sentiment, which demands larger liberty for women. Formerly women themselves were strong opponents of divorce. They frowned upon those of their sisters who escaped from matrimony bonds for any reason whatever; but now their feeling as to the matter has undergone so great a change that divorce obtained for any cause permitted in the Union is countenanced by the society which lays down the law of fashion for every community. So far from supporting the strict divorce of this State, wherein it has its root, this society practically demands the freest divorce which is allowed by any State.

Hence the agitation for concurrence of State legislation as to divorce is not likely to succeed in its purpose unless New York lets down the bars with which it surrounds matrimony. In other words, the compromise by which alone such concurrence could be brought about would probably necessitate the relaxation of our divorce law, for New York is as much at one extreme as the States which allow the greatest freedom of divorce are at the other. No concession of the sort will be made by this State. The Roman Catholic influence is too strong, and therefore the movement begun by the Boston League under the leadership of Governor HILL's Commission promises to be fruitless.

A Judicial View of Trousers.

One of the funniest libel suits on record has just been decided by the Court of Appeal in England. In the vast majority of cases this court is the tribunal of last resort under the existing English judicial system, though certain classes of appeals are allowed to the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The plaintiff in the case to which we refer is a tailor named BOLANDER, and the defendant is the editor of a trade journal named the *Tailor and World*. The alleged libel was published in this paper, and was in these words:

"One of the most ridiculous breast pockets I ever saw in my life was in a coat worn by a young man of the name of Henry who was with Bolander for a short time. We had occasion to call at the time, and we remember asking our old student if he called that a specimen of good tailoring. It was about half way down the breast and stretched across the fore part, and enough to make a teacher of Bolander and a yet friend Bol. One of the men who talk tidily about elevating the English tailor. Let him first begin with his own countryman, the Jew. We do not want to see him in the position of a teacher of tailors in this country, nor yet how to elevate coat art, as we think it is beginning at the wrong end."

The case came on for trial before Sir HENRY HAWKINS, the Judge who has presided over so many celebrated criminal trials, and a special jury. There was no question about the publication of the words of which the plaintiff complained; and the only issue submitted to the jury was whether the language was libellous, and if so, what damages the complainant ought to recover. The evidence introduced in his behalf tended to show that the words were "common" used in the article, meant trousers—that is to say, tailors who worked as making trousers, and that these tailors were generally beginners in the trade. Hence it was argued that the article charged BOLANDER with making inferior coats, and thereby injured him in his business, because it gave the public to understand that he employed as coatmakers mere tyros who were only fit to make trousers.

The jury were intelligent enough, however, to find for the defendant, and by the form of their verdict declared that there was no libel. From the judgment rendered upon this verdict the plaintiff appealed, and the appeal came on to be heard before three of the ablest judges in England—Lord ESKIN, the Master of the Rolls, Sir JAMES HARRIS, the well-known Probate Judge, and Lord JUSTICE FRY, who is, perhaps, the only Judge on the bench in England or America.

The counsel for the plaintiff, in arguing the appeal, began with the proposition that the article in the *Tailor and World* was clearly libellous and prejudicial to the plaintiff; but he had not gone far before he was interrupted by the Master of the Rolls, who said: "It is too ridiculous. What is the libel? It is to call a tailor a drummer?"

"Yes," answered the plaintiff's counsel, "because a trousers hand is only a beginner." "Do not believe it," answered the Master of the Rolls. "There are hundreds of young men in London who are very particular about their trousers; if you told them that they were made by beginners, they would go mad. They can see their trousers, you know, and they cannot see their coats." These observations from the bench rather tended to disconcert the learned gentleman who was endeavoring to support the cause of the plaintiff, who still insisted, however, that the language was libellous, inasmuch as it clearly implied that his client BOLANDER

The Colored Philosophers Join In.

The colored theologians and philosophers have been asked to take part in the present religious discussion which is now agitating the whole Christian Church. The last number of their quarterly review contains as many as three papers devoted to the examination of the new method of Biblical criticism, and the questions of the immortality of the soul and the authority of revelation. "The Entitative Mission of Thought" is the ambitious title of a philosophical discussion by the Rev. J. H. WELCH, a colored preacher of Frankfort, in Kentucky. We confess that we cannot always follow this metaphysical down to the depths into which he dives with a confidence so serene; but his conclusion seems to be that, while thought is substantial, it is not material. "The soul and body," he argues, "are substances, but both are immaterial. The former is immortal; the latter material in its nature. Mind is not matter," he proceeds, "neither is matter mind." Answering the question whether thought is an "entitative force," he says that "the very existence of thought indicates a mission or purpose, and the conceded means of promoting this end is force or energy." That may be so; though perhaps his proposition of "the superiority of thought to an idea" needs to be cleared up a little to bring it within the popular comprehension. But the practical application of his laborious attempt to define thought is easily understood. It is that if "thought is nothing more than a molecular product of the brain," the soul has no existence separate from the body, and there is no personal immortality. Against this conclusion his verbiage, and, indeed, the latter material in its nature. Mind is not matter," he proceeds, "neither is matter mind." Answering the question whether thought is an "entitative force," he says that "the very existence of thought indicates a mission or purpose, and the conceded means of promoting this end is force or energy." 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